



# SECURITY COUNCIL REPORT PROFILE REPORT



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## AFGHANISTAN

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### Background

For the last quarter of a century, Afghanistan has been embroiled in conflict. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 was followed by a decade of clashes between Soviet troops and Afghan fighters, the *mujahedin*. After the withdrawal of the Soviet army in 1988, and the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, factional fighting among the *mujahedin* forces continued until 1996, when the capital, Kabul, was taken by the Taliban. The Taliban never completely controlled Afghan territory, and continued to clash with *mujahedin* factions in the north of the country. The US-led invasion following the attacks in the US on 11 September 2001 toppled the Taliban, but US and NATO troops have yet to bring peace to the whole country. Afghanistan has made some strides towards stability, but is still considered to be a fragile state.

Afghanistan, a country of multiple ethnic communities—Pashtuns in the south and east, Tajiks and Uzbeks in the north, Hazaras in the central regions—joined the United Nations in 1946, as one of its earliest members. The country benefited from a range of bilateral and multilateral development initiatives between the 1950s and the 1970s, but by the late 1970s Afghanistan was a major front in the Cold War. After three coups in the 1970s that toppled a monarchy and two communist governments, the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan. In December 1979, Soviet forces deposed President Hafizullah Amin, who had risen to power after leading a revolt against communist President Nur Mohammed Taraki.

After the Soviet invasion, Islamic groups and ethnic forces began to clash with the Afghan communist leaders and the Soviets, whose presence reached more than 100,000 troops. By 1980 the opposition forces, known as the *mujahedin*, were fighting Soviet forces with arms and money supplied by the United States, Pakistan, China, Iran and Saudi Arabia, all countries that either opposed Soviet rule or

had wanted to stem the flow of over three million refugees out of Afghanistan. The *mujahedin* were joined by thousands of Muslim radicals from the Middle East and Africa, eager to fight the Soviet Union in the name of Islam. Among them was Usama bin Laden, who first came to Pakistan and Afghanistan in the early 1980s for a period, and built training facilities for foreign recruits.

During the Soviet occupation, and the ensuing war with the *mujahedin*, both sides of the conflict committed serious human rights abuses, attacking civilians, and destroying civilian infrastructure. The Afghan government working alongside the Soviet forces committed grievous state-sponsored acts of violence against its own people. Villages and refugee camps were bombed and shelled, landmines were used indiscriminately, and civilians were forcibly evacuated, arrested and imprisoned or killed. The indiscriminate attacks on civilians, especially in the countryside, and the repression in the cities eventually caused up to 5 million Afghans to flee Afghanistan for the relative safety of Iran and Pakistan by 1987-88. With up to 3 million refugees, Pakistan became the logistical base for the *mujahedin* resistance, and began to suffer direct attacks from Afghanistan.

In 1986 the Babrak Karmal government, installed by the Soviet forces, was replaced by one headed by Dr. Najibullah, a communist, who had been forced into exile for his political activities, but returned in 1979 after the Soviet invasion. Before becoming the president of Afghanistan in 1986, Najibullah had headed up the notorious and brutal secret police.

The war in Afghanistan placed a considerable strain on the Soviet Union, both economically and politically. In the second half of the 1980s, the Soviet Union became increasingly amenable to finding a solution which would allow its troop withdrawal in a face-saving manner. Negotiations to find such a solution took place in Geneva, facilitated by the UN. After almost a decade of brutal conflict, in April 1988 the Soviets agreed to a peace agreement, known as the Geneva Accords, and withdrew their troops. As part of the agreement, Afghanistan and Pakistan, who had been engaged in a low-level cross-border conflict, also signed an agreement on non-intervention. Significantly, the *mujahedin* were not a party to the Accords, and subsequently refused to accept its terms, leading to renewed conflict.

Following the withdrawal of the Soviet troops, the ethnic, clan, religious and personality differences among the *mujahedin* and other militias resurfaced, and the civil war continued. In 1992 *mujahedin* troops took Kabul forcing President Najibullah to take refuge in the UN compound, where he remained until his violent death four years later. The *mujahedin* factions installed Sebghatullah Mojadiddi as president, succeeded several months later by Burhannudin Rabbani.

The Taliban, a group of Islamic fundamentalists and the product of a network of religious schools in Pakistan (*madrasas*), which had been sources of recruitment for *mujahedin* during the war against the Soviet Union, became the main opposition to the Rabbani government in 1994. Mostly Pashtuns that were children of *mujahedin* soldiers who grew up in exile, the Taliban criticised the country's Uzbek and Tajik leaders for allowing corruption and called for stricter adherence to Islamic law. The Taliban favoured laws based on strict tribal code, its version of Islamic law, which included such punishments as stoning for adultery and amputation for burglary. The Taliban and its leader, Mullah Omar, with assistance from Pakistan, overthrew Rabbani, and took Kabul on 26 September 1996. Rabbani fled to the relative safety of the north. During the takeover, former president Najibullah was dragged from the UN compound and executed. Images of the execution and of the dead bodies of Najibullah and his brother hanging in central Kabul set the tone for the people of Kabul of what could be expected from the Taliban regime. Usama bin Laden, exiled from his native Saudi Arabia, returned to Afghanistan in 1996 after his refuge in Sudan was cut short by the Sudanese government, and developed a close relationship with Mullah Omar. He set up a base of operations in Kandahar

where he trained fighters to fight alongside the Taliban, and began setting up the extensive network of communications and financing between related groups and individuals, which was to become Al-Qaida.

During the period of Taliban control, from 1996 to 2001, fighting continued with separate groups and factions, particularly in the north of the country, which the Taliban never successfully controlled. Parts of the territory under the Taliban control, such as Kandahar, for example, were more peaceful than in the preceding years, in part because the Taliban directed most of their energies into the war effort and maintaining security. However, the human rights and humanitarian situation for Afghan people worsened considerably. Human rights abuses under the Taliban were horrific. They included indiscriminate bombing, the targeting of civilians, torture, restrictions on the freedom of association, expression, the rights of women and rampant religious intolerance. At the time, there was no applicable constitution and no national judicial system.

The Taliban imposed severe restrictions on the population, particularly women. The restrictions required that women be fully veiled, forbid them most education and employment and imposed strict limitations on their access to public services, including health care. The Taliban have also required men to grow full, untrimmed beards, cut their hair short and attend mosque. They forbid any social mingling or communication among men and women outside the family.

The opposition within the country was led by the Northern Alliance, a coalition of different groups based in the north-eastern part of the country. The coalition of separate groups together called themselves the United National Islamic Front for the Salvation of Afghanistan, or the United Front. The United Front included Rabbani and consisted of four groups of ethnic minorities. They received support from both Russia and Iran.

During this period, international humanitarian aid and development assistance was curtailed due to the ongoing hostilities and the insecure environment; the humanitarian crisis worsened. Both the Taliban and certain United Front forces routinely engaged in human rights abuses, targeting civilians, women and ethnic minorities. There was widespread use of rape, forcible displacement and abduction of women as means of war.

The Northern Alliance was dealt a serious blow when their charismatic military leader, Ahmed Shah Massoud, was killed by two suicide assassins posing as journalists on 9 September 2001, in a final effort to undermine resistance to the Taliban. The killing of Massoud was followed by the attacks on the United States two days later, on 11 September 2001, when suicide bombers used hijacked airplanes to attack targets in New York and Washington DC. The next day, the Security Council, in resolution 1368, "unequivocally condemned in the strongest terms the horrifying attacks." On 28 September 2001, acting under Chapter VII, the Council adopted resolution 1373, deciding that all states should prevent and suppress financing of terrorist attacks and called on all states to cooperate to prevent and suppress such attacks, and to deny safe haven to those who finance, plan or support terrorist acts. Attention had focused by this time on Usama bin Laden, and the protection offered to his organisation, Al-Qaida, by the Taliban in Afghanistan.

On 7 October 2001, after the Taliban refused American demands to extradite Usama bin Laden, a US-led international coalition attacked Afghanistan.

The operation was named Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF). Northern Alliance forces, with support from the coalition, took Kabul on 13 November 2001. By late November the Taliban were effectively removed from power. Coalition forces, most of them now under NATO command, have continued to

fight pockets of Taliban and Al-Qaida resistance. During 2006, Taliban resistance grew in strength. As of November 2006 much of southern and eastern Afghanistan is relatively insecure.

### **Multilateral Efforts**

Historically, the engagement of the international community with the problems in Afghanistan has been inconsistent and often ineffective.

The first international actor to become involved after the Soviet invasion in 1979 was the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). The agency had been asked for assistance by Pakistan which began experiencing a refugee flow in the late 1970s due to in-fighting between the leftist government and Islamic traditionalists. By the time of the Soviet invasion at the end of 1979, the number of refugees in Pakistan had reached 400,000. At its peak, in 1990, the number stood at nearly 3.3 million.

The Security Council, the General Assembly, the Secretary-General and other UN bodies all became involved in different ways, but the different approaches were far from comprehensive and the periodic disengagement of the international community contributed to the collapse into continuous fighting.

The Security Council was not able to address the situation in Afghanistan during the period between 1980 and 1989. The Soviet Union vetoed a proposed resolution in December 1979 and blocked further action by the Council. The issue of Afghanistan therefore stayed off the Security Council agenda for the duration of the Soviet military involvement in Afghanistan. It only reappeared in 1994, when the violence and escalating human rights abuses prompted condemnation from the Council.

### **General Assembly**

The General Assembly, however, was able to act following the Soviet invasion. Under the Uniting for Peace procedure, the General Assembly met in a special session a few weeks after the Soviet invasion and passed resolution ES.6/2 on 14 January 1980, in which it deplored the armed intervention and called for the immediate withdrawal of foreign forces in Afghanistan. Throughout the 1980s the General Assembly maintained a sporadic focus on Afghanistan, adopting a series of resolutions that called for an end to the conflict, withdrawal of foreign troops, UN assistance to find a political settlement and international assistance for refugees and others affected by the conflict. During the period, the focus on the human rights situation in Afghanistan rose higher on the agenda at the General Assembly. The Commission on Human Rights appointed a Special Rapporteur to Afghanistan in May 1984, who continued to report to both the Commission and the General Assembly at regular intervals, tracking the deteriorating human rights situation in Afghanistan until 2003. The General Assembly responded by regularly issuing strongly worded resolutions on the human rights abuses.

### **Secretary-General**

The Secretary-General continued to be engaged in Afghanistan throughout the Soviet invasion period, and afterwards, by appointing Personal Representatives and Special Envoys to act on his behalf. Following the Soviet invasion, the Secretary-General's Personal Representative was Javier Pérez de Cuellar from April 1981 until his appointment as Secretary-General in January 1982. Other Personal Representatives included Diego Córdovez, who served in that post from 1982-88, and was the chief mediator in the Geneva negotiations, and Benon Sevan who held the post in 1989. UN missions were established in Afghanistan to support the UN representatives.

*The United Nations Good Offices Mission in Afghanistan and Pakistan (UNGOMAP) 1988-1990*

UNGOMAP was established on 15 May 1988 in accordance with the Agreements on the Settlement of the Situation Relating to Afghanistan (the Geneva Accords), an agreement between Afghanistan, Pakistan, the Soviet Union and the United States. UNGOMAP was authorised by the Council in October of that year under resolution 622, and was staffed by fifty military observers.

The mandate of UNGOMAP was derived from the Accords and followed a fairly traditional peace monitoring mandate, and included:

- monitoring of non-interference and non-intervention by the parties in each other's affairs;
- monitoring of the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan; and
- monitoring of the voluntary return of refugees.

UNGOMAP's mandate formally ended on 15 March 1990, one year after the end of the withdrawal of the Soviet troops.

Following the Soviet withdrawal, the political and strategic stakes seemed to become confused for the international community. There appeared to be a fragmentation of the international approach to the problems in Afghanistan with the result that the focus was limited to the humanitarian situation. A small UN office was established to help coordinate political and humanitarian efforts.

#### *The Office of the Secretary-General in Afghanistan and Pakistan (OSGAP) 1990-1996*

In 1990, as the conflict in Afghanistan worsened, the Secretary-General established a successor to UNGOMAP, OSGAP, with offices in Islamabad, Pakistan in accordance with the General Assembly resolution 44/15. OSGAP was responsible for monitoring political aspects of the crisis and promoting a peace process.

Humanitarian efforts were coordinated through the UN Office of the Coordinator for Afghanistan (UNOCA) and subsequently through the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) in Afghanistan. It negotiated agreements making it possible for humanitarian actors to cross political and military lines to provide assistance as needed anywhere in Afghanistan.

The separation between the political and humanitarian tracks was seen as important in order to maintain the neutral and impartial nature of the humanitarian mission, although for long periods, the two tracks were headed by the same individual. In 1996 OSGAP was renamed and incorporated into the UN Special Mission to Afghanistan (UNSMA).

#### *UN Special Mission to Afghanistan (UNSMA) 1993-2001*

In December 1993, in response to the further deterioration in the situation in Afghanistan, the General Assembly requested the Secretary-General to establish a new mission, UNSMA, to assist with the rapprochement and reconstruction efforts in Afghanistan (A/RES/48/208), which was welcomed by the Security Council in January 1994 (S/PRST/1994/4). The focus of the mission was to establish and facilitate discussions between the warring factions. The mission aimed to achieve a cessation of hostilities, sought a regional political consensus in support of the peace process, and sought direct negotiations between all parties on a political settlement.

The mission also:

- worked to expand contacts within the Afghan political community and with interlocutors in neighbouring countries;
- coordinated with the UN resident and humanitarian coordinator for Afghanistan;
- discussed directly with the Taliban leadership concerns of the UN and the international community; and
- established the civil affairs unit within the UNSMA as approved by the General Assembly.

The mission, under a weak General Assembly mandate, had none of the resources or robustness that has characterised missions under strong Security Council mandates. It attempted periodically to facilitate dialogue between and among the warring factions, but with little success. The framework employed by the UN was drawn from the traditional model of bilateral discussion between states. It was not well suited to multiparty discussion between groups which included non-state actors, who frequently questioned the role, the framework, and the very legitimacy of the UN presence.

The role of the UN in Afghanistan was further complicated when former president Najibullah took refuge in its compound in Kabul. Najibullah, known as “the Butcher,” from his time as the former head of the secret police, was loathed by the *mujahedin* government of Rabbani, and could find no other safe location within Afghanistan. He remained sequestered in the UN compound for four years, under UN protection. As the Taliban approached, the UN withdrew its senior staff. The Rabbani government offered Najibullah a safe passage out of Kabul which he turned down. The Taliban did not respect the inviolability of the UN compound, an ominous pattern which they were to repeat.

UNSMA had very little success facilitating dialogue between the warring parties, and the humanitarian situation within Afghanistan continued to deteriorate as the conflict wore on.

After his appointment the new Secretary-General Kofi Annan increased the profile of the UN efforts in Afghanistan in July 1997 by appointing a high-level special envoy, Ambassador Lakhdar Brahimi, former minister of foreign affairs of Algeria and a long-standing UN diplomat, to oversee the effort. Brahimi took over at a time when the situation was particularly difficult and complex. His dealings with the Taliban were difficult partly as a result of the lack of recognition of the Taliban regime. Since the capture of Kabul by the Taliban in September 1996, the Rabbani government in the north had continued to retain international recognition including holding Afghanistan’s UN seat. No UN member state except for Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates recognised the Taliban. However, the Taliban controlled the largest amount of territory and population in Afghanistan and this significantly complicated the UN’s role in the country.

The humanitarian operations of the UN were also struggling to deal with the complicated and harsh situation. Each arm of the UN faced similar problems of lack of access and a difficult environment. The different agencies each pursued their own mandates, and with no recognised government to coordinate with or to establish a national plan, the operations were functioning in a chaotic environment. Further, Taliban edicts made it difficult for programs to reach their intended beneficiaries.

### **Change in International Response Following 11 September 2001**

The 11 September 2001 attacks showed that weakened states such as Afghanistan can threaten international peace in multiple ways. The presumed link between the neglect of the situation in Afghanistan by the international community and development of Afghanistan as a haven for militant and terrorist activity sharpened the focus on Afghanistan, and served to increase the commitment of the international community to be involved in developing a framework for political transition, and in the rebuilding process.

The Security Council passed two resolutions against terrorism, and recognised the inherent right to self-defence as a legitimate response to such an attack. The Council played no direct role in authorising the subsequent use of military force in Afghanistan by coalition forces; it did affirm on 14 November 2001 that the UN should play a central role in supporting the efforts to establish a new administration (S/RES/1374).

Lakhdar Brahimi of Algeria, the Secretary-General's Special Representative for Afghanistan, facilitated talks in Bonn, Germany among Afghan leaders in November and December 2001. The talks produced an agreement for an interim government, called the Interim Administration, led by Chairman Hamid Karzai (S/2001/1154). The Interim Authority prepared the way for the convening of an Emergency *Loya Jirga* to elect a transitional administration, which would govern until full elections could be held. A *Loya Jirga* is a traditional consultative assembly in Afghanistan, at which tribal leaders have met to settle intertribal disputes, and discuss reforms. Under the leadership of Brahimi, the focus of the Bonn agreement was to bolster Afghan capacity, and to rely only on limited international presence. This approach came to be known as the 'light footprint' approach, and was a sharp divergence from the previous approach used in Timor-Leste and Kosovo, which relied on a massive international presence and personnel at all levels. The Bonn Agreement was not, however, a traditional peace agreement: it was an externally mediated agreement among victors in a war, won primarily by the US. The Afghans present were primarily from the Northern Alliance, the pro-Royalist Rome Group and the so called Cyprus Group of Hodayoun Jareer, which meant that only certain ethnic groups initially dominated the key positions of power in Afghanistan subsequent to the Bonn Agreement. Further, the Bonn Agreement did not include any provisions for integration of the defeated parties (primarily the Taliban) in the post-war environment. Key issues, such as demobilisation, the composition of the new national army and the nature of the relations between Kabul and the Afghan provinces were not included, and remained to be negotiated under UN auspices.

An annex to the Bonn Agreement requested that the Security Council authorise the deployment of a multinational force to assist the government in providing security. The Security Council, in resolution 1386 of 20 December 2001, authorised the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), which consisted of a coalition of troops from various nations that would assist the new government in Kabul. ISAF was deployed in conjunction with, but distinct from, the separate US-led coalition forces under US command, Operation Enduring Freedom which continued combat operations against Taliban and Al-Qaida forces within Afghanistan.

The UN increased its presence in Afghanistan in March 2002, when the Council, in resolution 1401, established the UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA), whose mandate has been to provide support for the implementation of the Bonn Agreement. The Bonn Agreement also established several benchmarks for future progress in Afghanistan, which culminated with an election in September 2005. The new parliament was inaugurated on 19 December.

Long-term international involvement in Afghanistan was discussed and agreed upon in London in January 2006 at a meeting attended by representatives from the Afghan government, and representatives from over seventy other states, international institutions and donors. The resulting strategy, "The Afghanistan Compact," is essentially a five-year plan of continued peacebuilding in Afghanistan and reaffirms the international community's commitment to aid Afghans in the reconstruction of their country and in the peace process (S/2006/105). An additional \$10.5 billion was pledged for reconstruction efforts in Afghanistan. The Compact has a timeline and benchmarks on governance, security, human rights, counternarcotics and reconstruction. The document further mandates that the UN will co-chair an aid coordination mechanism with the Afghan government.

## **Current International Presence**

*International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) 2001 to present*

Acting under Chapter VII, the Council authorised ISAF to assist the Afghan Interim Authority in the maintenance of security in Kabul and its surrounding areas, in resolution 1386 of 20 December 2001, and in subsequent resolutions 1413 and 1444. ISAF was tasked with performing two functions: protecting civilians and providing public security. ISAF's initial deployment in Kabul only was contrary to the recommendations of the Brahimi Report (Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations, S/2000/809), which had emphasised the importance of a "robust force posture" to "create space in which peace can be built". The restricted deployment seemed to signal to the Afghan population that the international community did not have the resources or the will to deliver what was needed as a foundation for political stability, namely security. Two years passed before ISAF's mandate was extended to cover the whole of Afghanistan.

ISAF coordinates its activities directly with the Afghan government, holding meetings with the Afghan minister of the interior, as well as working directly with Afghan military units.

NATO took over responsibility for all command of ISAF in August 2003. In October of that year, the Council, responding to pleas from the Afghan government, updated ISAF's mandate to extend beyond Kabul (S/RES/1510). ISAF has since established reconstruction teams in provincial areas throughout the country (known as Provincial Reconstruction Teams, or PRTs) and as of October 2006 reached approximately 31,000 troops from thirty-seven countries. The PRTs were initially established by the US-led coalition in December 2002 and proved to be a successful mechanism to extend stability with reconstruction efforts into rural areas of Afghanistan. Control of the PRTs has since been adopted by ISAF. The PRTs combine the traditional patrolling, monitoring and stabilisation efforts of the military with the provision of security for on-going reconstruction efforts by the international community. In areas where the security situation does not allow for international organisations to operate freely, the PRTs themselves undertake some of the reconstruction efforts.

Over the course of 2006, ISAF expanded into all remaining Afghan provinces. It took responsibility for assisting with security and reconstruction in the entire country in October, following a high-level NATO meeting on 21 September. This was seen as necessary for increasing the effectiveness of operations and to offset overall troop shortfalls. As part of this expansion, ISAF's troop levels increased from 9,000 to approximately 31,000, with the bulk of the additional forces coming from Canada, Germany, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom and US troops that were previously under OEF command. In addition, NATO approved more robust rules of engagement for the troops, which went into effect in February 2006.

Although the original ISAF mandate was set to expire with the completion of the Bonn process, NATO's Secretary-General and other allied officials have pledged that ISAF will remain in Afghanistan until peace and stability are restored.

In addition to helping provide security and extending state authority, ISAF has assisted with security sector reform, training, disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration of former combatants. As of November 2006 it is clear that the security situation in Afghanistan, particularly in the south and the east, is stretching ISAF and its capacity to respond effectively. Security has deteriorated drastically in these areas during 2006 with a proliferation of suicide-bombings, Taliban attacks and a civilian death toll at a level not seen since 2001. ISAF's increasingly difficult mission to provide security in an environment growing more insecure is not matched by an increase in resources. PRTs are reported to be understaffed and underfinanced and NATO is facing a shortage of troops to conduct its operations.

The way ISAF will conduct operations in the future remains unclear. It is performing different tasks in



different parts of the country. Operations in the north are more focused on reconstruction activity, while activity in the south is mainly focused on counterinsurgency. National caveats on the rules of engagement further complicate the situation, with a number of troop-contributing countries only willing to have their nationals engage in reconstruction activities, leaving the south particularly understaffed.

Although ISAF is required to report to the Council regularly on its activities, its reporting practices remain somewhat erratic. ISAF's mandate was extended in September 2006, (a month earlier than required, in response to a logistics-related request from NATO) until October 2007 (S/RES/1707).

#### *UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) 2002 – present*

In March 2002, the Council, in resolution 1401, established UNAMA, whose mandate has been to provide support for the implementation of the Bonn Agreement. UNAMA, in line with the “light footprint” approach established by Brahimi, represents a unique model for UN operations of this type. UNAMA was conceived of as a small mission in comparison to the sizes of preceding missions in Timor-Leste and Kosovo, and based on the principle of local leadership. Despite its size, however, a great deal was expected from the mission. UNAMA was further constrained by the poor security situation outside Kabul, the incomplete nature of the Bonn Agreement, the composition of the post-Bonn power structure, and the complexity of the inter-Afghan political process.

UNAMA's mandate is to:

- create political legitimacy through democratisation;
- maintain peace and stability through negotiation of dispute with the help of the UN Secretary-General's good offices;
- monitor and report on human rights abuses;
- advise on the development of institutions and assist in coordinating external support for the reconstruction process; and
- manage all UN humanitarian relief, recovery and reconstruction in coordination with the Afghan government.

UNAMA was designed with two separate pillars: Pillar 1 (Political Affairs) and Pillar 2 (Relief, Recovery, and Development), each headed by a Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General, who reports directly to the Special Representative of the Secretary-General. UNAMA has been charged with integrating the various UN activities in Afghanistan and placing them under the watch of the Secretary-General's Special Representative and UNAMA's Chief of Mission, currently, Tom Koenigs of Germany. UNAMA also has Special Advisors on Human Rights, Gender, Drugs, Rule of Law, Police, Military and Demobilisation and Legal Issues. While the two pillar structure followed the “light footprint” approach, the initial lack of coordination between the two pillars provided for some initial problems.

From the beginning, the importance of local ownership and light interventionism was stressed. UNAMA was in the difficult position of simultaneously supporting and working with the Interim Authority, and working towards building a broader-based government. At the same time, UNAMA was facing the enormous development challenges of a country emerging from decades of conflict, with a devastated infrastructure.

UNAMA has successfully helped with the supervision of elections, the disarming of Afghan forces and investigations into human rights violations. UNAMA's original mandate requested the Secretary-General to give a report on UNAMA to the Council every four months. The updated mandate, in resolution 1589 of 24 March 2005, requested that the Secretary-General give reports in a timely manner and in the period since, he has been reporting every six months, UNAMA's current mandate

expires on 24 March 2007.

The Secretary-General's most recent report to the Council on UNAMA in September 2006 (S/2006/727) noted that at no time since the fall of the Taliban in 2001 the threat to Afghanistan's transition had been so severe with a three- to four-fold increase in the rate of casualties compared to 2005 and a considerable rise in anti-government attacks. Annan reported that the deteriorating security situation had grave implications for the upholding of human rights and the rule of law, as well as the ability of the UN and aid organisations to conduct their humanitarian operations. In light of the security challenges, he welcomed the expansion to ISAF into the south. Annan emphasised the importance of reinforcing government capacity to deliver security and bring development. In this regard, he suggested that the reform of the Afghan police be accelerated and the disbandment of illegal armed groups and curtailing of the drug trade be made a priority.

### **Security Council Involvement**

Afghanistan was on the agenda for the Security Council for the first time in January 1980, following the December 1979 invasion of Afghanistan by the Soviet Union. The Council considered a draft resolution that condemned the intervention of foreign troops, but it was clear that a resolution condemning one of the permanent members would never be adopted, and, indeed, it was vetoed by the Soviet Union. After the use of the veto by the Soviet Union, and until after the Soviet Union was no longer involved in Afghanistan, the Council was inactive in responding to events in Afghanistan.

After the Soviet withdrawal, the terms of which were negotiated with UN facilitation, the Council was much freer to address the threats to peace and security posed by the ongoing conflict in Afghanistan. However, the real period of engagement did not start until after the establishment of the Taliban government in Kabul.

Between 1996 and 2001, the Council responded to the worsening humanitarian and human rights situation by issuing eleven presidential statements urging parties to the conflict to cooperate with the efforts to build peace in the region and fruitlessly urged the warring parties to return to the negotiating table (presidential statements 1996/6, 1996/40, 1997/20, 1997/35, 1997/55, 1998/9, 1998/22, 1998/24, 1998/27 1999/29 and 2000/12). Further, the Council issued five resolutions condemning the violence (resolutions 1076, 1189, 1193, 1214 and 1267), and eventually imposed sanctions against the Taliban in resolutions 1267, 1333 and 1363. Afghanistan during the Taliban period was the target of some of the strongest human rights language in any Council resolution.

However, beyond the issuance of resolutions, which were largely ignored by the parties within Afghanistan and frequently by neighbouring states, and making statements deploring the violence, the Council took no decisive steps. In retrospect, it was a period of talk, and little effective action. The Council appeared unable or unwilling to concentrate effectively on the situation. It expressed continued support for UNSMA, and discussed more effective sanctions, but the sanctions were frequently not complied with by neighbouring countries. The Council took no steps to enforce their compliance.

By contrast, for a period after the attacks of 11 September 2001, the Council was extremely closely engaged, and, through its oversight of UNAMA and ISAF, began to follow some aspects of events in Afghanistan more closely. However, the Council has remained distant from the management of security operations which have been under direct control of the US and NATO.

In 2002, during the first year of operation of UNAMA and ISAF, Afghanistan was prominent on the agenda and the Council discussed Afghanistan eighteen times, a three-fold increase from the

previous year. Since then, the intensity has dimmed. In March 2006, UNAMA's mandate was renewed, and expanded somewhat to include responsibilities to co-chair the Joint Coordination and Monitoring Board, designed to "ensure the overall strategic coordination of the implementation of the Compact" with the government of Afghanistan. Given this role assigned to the UN under the Afghanistan Compact, and the recent serious deterioration in the security situation, the Council decision to send a mission to Afghanistan in November 2006 represents a clear desire to step up its attention to security in Afghanistan in the near future.

### *Sanctions Regime*

In 1999, the Security Council imposed a sanctions regime on the Taliban, including the freezing of Taliban leaders' assets, ban on flights of any aircraft owned, leased or operated by the Taliban, an arms embargo and diplomatic sanctions (resolution 1267). The impetus behind the sanctions came from evidence of Al-Qaida's involvement in the bombing attacks of two US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in August 1998, and the presence of training camps in Afghanistan. The resolution, adopted under Chapter VII, also demanded that the Taliban stop all support for international terrorism, close all training camps, and extradite Usama bin Laden, who had been indicted by a court in New York on 4 November 1998 for his role in the bombings. In December 2000 the Council strengthened the sanctions, requiring all states to close Taliban offices in their countries, to close all offices of the national airline of Afghanistan, Ariana Afghan Airlines, to restrict international travel of Taliban officials of rank Deputy Minister or higher, and to freeze the financial assets of bin Laden and his associates (resolution 1333). These sanctions were difficult to implement, and the difficulties encountered resulted in a monitoring mechanism in July 2001 (resolution 1363). The Taliban, however, only had limited assets abroad, and since much of its economic activity consisted in black market trade in heroin and opium the financial asset freeze had limited effect. The arms embargo also did not appear to have much impact; arms in Afghanistan were already plentiful and borders relatively porous.

The report by the Committee of Experts in May 2001 on the effectiveness of the sanctions (S/2001/511) noted that the sanctions were routinely violated by Afghanistan's neighbours, singling out Pakistan in particular for its role in continuing to arm and supply the Taliban with goods needed for its war effort, including fuel, and Iran for its role in arming the United Front.

After 11 September 2001, the Council imposed a blanket mandatory sanctions regime on all terrorists (resolution 1373). Despite the broad and sweeping nature of the sanctions, they did not seem to have an effect on the Taliban, who refused to hand over bin Laden, even when, after 11 September, their non-compliance brought the near certainty of war to Afghanistan.

Much of the sanctions regime is still in place on the Taliban, bin Laden and his associates.

### **Underlying Problems**

The recent intensification in Taliban attacks, particularly in the south and east, is a significant obstacle to rebuilding efforts and to the consolidation of government based on the new constitution. While international staff are targeted on occasion leading some NGOs, such as *Médecins Sans Frontières*, to pull out of Afghanistan, the violence is widespread, and impacts mostly on the local communities. The number of suicide bombings has drastically increased and there are signs of a resurgence of foreign fighters as well. In addition, the escalation of factional tensions in the northwest has contributed to the insecurity (see S/PV. 5369).

Although there have been great strides in the establishment of political institutions, the Afghan political stage has long been riven with factionalism—between ethnicities, regions, religions, and

strong personalities. These fractures continue to affect Afghan politics and undermine stability. In addition, following the fall of the Taliban, the international forces included some of what were formerly called “warlords” in the new governance structure. Leaving those leaders in place has complicated the political governance landscape. Tension between the civil administration in Kabul and the military fiefdoms in some of the provinces has not been resolved. The “warlords” still rule in some of the countryside, and their support for the central government is weak. They have poor human rights records and some are involved in criminal activities.

Calls to bring to justice those responsible for some of the crimes and human rights abuses during the 1990s have stalled. A move towards charging those responsible was delayed in the expectation that the formation of the parliament would give the country more stability. However, following the formation of parliament in September 2005, steps towards seeking redress became further complicated with some individuals who might be accused of war crimes now serving in parliament itself.

Afghanistan is one of the poorest countries of the world, beset by massive poverty, compounded by the decades of war and natural disasters such as drought and earthquakes. In 2004, Afghanistan ranked 173<sup>rd</sup> out of 178 countries on the Human Development Index. Life expectancy is forty-four years; only 40 percent of the population has access to safe drinking water, and per capita gross domestic product is a meagre \$190. Efforts to provide a stable, prosperous future for the Afghan population may take many more years.

While conditions for women and girls are better now than under the Taliban, they still face considerable discrimination in both public and private spheres. It is difficult for women to move about freely, and many fear violent attacks when they leave their homes. With poor access to health facilities and a chronic shortage of qualified female health workers, women in Afghanistan continue to have one of the world’s highest maternal mortality ratios, and only 14 percent of women are literate. Access to education for girls continues to be a problem with only 40 percent of school-aged girls currently enrolled in school.

The application of the Afghan constitution, written in 2004, may become increasingly complicated. While the constitution enshrined personal freedoms and recognised the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, *Sharia* law continues to be in effect, and the conflict between the two has already resulted in confusion. The Afghan government came under international scrutiny and pressure earlier in 2006 as a Christian convert was imprisoned and threatened with a trial and likely execution under *Sharia* law, in direct opposition to the religious freedoms outlined in the constitution.

Finally, many Afghan farmers have turned once again to poppy cultivation. In part this seems likely to be a response to the pervasive poverty. However, some observers also note that the absence of a firm policy both from the government in Kabul and also the international community has played a role in allowing the trade (which was significantly suppressed under the Taliban) emerge as a new problem. Afghanistan has become one of the main centres of production of heroin, and despite efforts to curb poppy cultivation, narcotics production and trafficking continues at a pace which in its own right could undermine the stability in Afghanistan. Proceeds from drug trafficking are estimated by the UN and the Afghan government to be approximately US \$2.7 billion in 2005, or more the half of the country’s gross national product. Proceeds from trafficking have been used to support efforts to attack international and Afghan forces. Recent efforts to improve the national narcotics prevention and eradication programs include a new National Drug Control Strategy presented at the Afghanistan Compact meeting in January, and shared with the Security Council in February (S/2006/106). However, the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime reported in September 2006 that opium

cultivation in Afghanistan had increased by 59 percent since 2005 (<http://www.unodc.org/pdf/execsummaryafg.pdf>). In October, the Council expressed concern at the increase of opium cultivation and trafficking in a press statement (SC/8860).

## UN Documents

### Security Council Resolutions

- S/RES/1707 (12 September 2006) extended ISAF's mandate until 13 October 2007.
- S/RES/1662 (23 March 2006) extended UNAMA's mandate until 23 March 2007.
- S/RES/1659 (15 February 2006) endorsed the Afghanistan Compact.
- S/RES/1623 (13 September 2005) extended ISAF's mandate until 13 October 2006.
- S/RES/1617 (29 July 2005) strengthened sanctions against the Taliban and Al-Qaida and extended the mandate of the 1267 Committee for an additional 17 months.
- S/RES/1589 (24 March 2005) extended UNAMA's mandate until 24 March 2006.
- S/RES/1563 (17 September 2004) extended ISAF for an additional year until 13 October 2005.
- S/RES/1536 (26 March 2004) extended UNAMA for an additional year until 26 March 2005.
- S/RES/1526 (30 January 2004) strengthened the mandate of the 1267 Committee, and made more specific the financial sanctions, travel ban and arms embargo imposed on the individuals associated with the Taliban and Al-Qaida.
- S/RES/1510 (13 October 2003) expanded ISAF's mandate beyond Kabul.
- S/RES/1471 (28 March 2003) extended UNAMA for an additional year until 28 March 2004, and endorsed the Secretary-General's proposal to include an electoral unit within UNAMA.
- S/RES/1456 (20 January 2003) called on states to implement sanctions against terrorists, and mentioned in particular the Taliban and Al-Qaida.
- S/RES/1455 (17 January 2003) called for a strengthening of sanctions against the Taliban and Al-Qaida.
- S/RES/1453 (24 December 2002) welcomed and endorsed the Kabul Declaration on Good-Neighbourly Relations.
- S/RES/1452 (20 December 2002) provided humanitarian exemptions to the assets freeze.
- S/RES/1444 (27 November 2002) extended ISAF's mandate for one year until 20 December 2003, and requested quarterly reports of its activities.
- S/RES/1419 (26 June 2002) welcomed the peaceful holding of the Emergency *Loya Jirga* from the 11 – 19 June 2002.
- S/RES/1413 (23 May 2002) extended ISAF's mandate for six months until 20 December 2002.
- S/RES/1401 (28 March 2002) created UNAMA.
- S/RES/1390 (28 January 2002) strengthened sanctions against the Taliban and Al-Qaida.
- S/RES/1388 (15 January 2002) amended sanctions on the Taliban and Al-Qaida, to not include Ariana Afghan Airlines.
- S/RES/1386 (20 December 2001) authorised the establishment of ISAF to provide security in Kabul.
- S/RES/1383 (6 December 2001) endorsed the Bonn Agreement on provisional arrangements until a permanent government could be re-established.
- S/RES/1378 (14 November 2001) supported efforts by the Afghan people to establish a new transitional broad-based multi-ethnic government, and affirmed that the UN should play a central role in the establishment of this transitional government.
- S/RES/1377 (12 November 2001) adopted a declaration on global efforts to combat terrorism.
- S/RES/1373 (28 September 2001) created a comprehensive package of measures to curb terrorism.
- S/RES/1368 (12 September 2001) condemned the attacks of 11 September 2001 on the United States, and called on states to bring justice to the perpetrators, organisers and sponsors of

those terrorist acts.

- S/RES/1363 (30 July 2001) stressed every state's obligation to comply with the sanctions imposed on the Taliban.
- S/RES/1333 (19 December 2000) strengthened the sanctions against the Taliban and imposed sanctions against Al-Qaida.
- S/RES/1267 (15 October 1999) insisted that the Taliban take appropriate action to comply with previous resolutions, cease the provision of sanctuary for the training of terrorists including Usama bin Laden, and imposed sanctions against the Taliban.
- S/RES/1214 (8 December 1998) expressed grave concern at the ongoing conflict in Afghanistan, and called on the Taliban and other factions to call a cease-fire, and to resume negotiations.
- S/RES/1193 (28 August 1998) expressed grave concern at the conflict in Afghanistan, and called it a growing threat to regional and international peace and security, demanded that all factions stop fighting and seek a peaceful resolution.
- S/RES/1189 (13 August 1998) strongly condemned the terrorist bomb attacks of 7 August 1998 in eastern Africa.
- S/RES/1076 (22 October 1996) called on all parties in Afghanistan to stop fighting, and engage in political dialogue. The Council also denounced the discrimination against girls and women.
- S/RES/647 (11 January 1990) agreed to deploy UN military officers in Afghanistan and Pakistan to assist with the mission of good offices.
- S/RES/622 (31 October 1988) authorised the establishment of UNGOMAP.

#### **Presidential Statements**

- S/PRST/2005/56 (23 November 2005) congratulated the Afghan people on successful elections.
- S/PRST/2005/40 (23 August 2005) welcomed progress towards upcoming elections, but expressed concern at the violence and disruption caused by certain parties.
- S/PRST/2004/35 (12 October 2004) welcomed the presidential elections on 9 October 2004 resulting in the election of Hamid Karzai.
- S/PRST/2004/25 (15 July 2004) supported holding the presidential elections on 9 October.
- S/PRST/2004/9 (6 April 2004) welcomed the results of the Berlin Conference and endorsed the Berlin Declaration. The Council also acknowledged the commitment by NATO to expand ISAF.
- S/PRST/2003/7 (17 June 2003) expressed concern at the security situation in Afghanistan, and welcomed the establishment of international civilian-military PRTs.
- S/PRST/2002/25 (11 September 2002) was adopted in remembrance of the events of 11 September 2001; the Council reaffirmed its resolve to tackle terrorism.
- S/PRST/2000/12 (7 April 2000) condemned the Taliban for launching new offensive in March, and for forced entry into the UN compound in Kandahar resulting in the withdrawal of the UN presence in southern Afghanistan. It further condemned the use of Afghan territory to shelter terrorists.
- S/PRST/1999/29 (22 October 1999) condemned the Taliban for launching a new offensive, using numerous foreign nationals and undermining international efforts to negotiate a peaceful settlement.
- S/PRST/1998/27 (15 September 1998) condemned the killing of Iranian diplomats by the Taliban, and expressed deep concern at the escalating military operations, and targeting of civilians.
- S/PRST/1998/24 (6 August 1998) urged all parties to return to the negotiating table.
- S/PRST/1998/22 (14 July 1998) expressed concern at the ethnic nature of the conflict and deplored the outside military assistance that warring factions were receiving.
- S/PRST/1998/9 (6 April 1998) commended the consolidation of the negotiation process with the

- convening of the “six-plus-two” group (Afghanistan’s neighbours plus Russia and the US).
- S/PRST/1997/55 (16 December 1997) called on all states to stop supplying the warring parties in Afghanistan with weapons and ammunition, and requested support for the UN mission (UNSMIA).
  - S/PRST/1997/35 (9 July 1997) called on warring parties to return to the negotiating table.
  - S/PRST/1997/20 (16 April 1997) called on all parties to cooperate with UNSMIA.
  - S/PRST/1996/40 (30 September 1996) expressed grave concern at the situation in Afghanistan, the violation of the UN compound, and expressed dismay at the brutal execution of former President Najibullah.
  - S/PRST/1996/6 (15 February 1996) called on all parties to end hostilities, and to allow for the distribution of humanitarian aid, and called on all states to assist UNSMIA.
  - S/PRST/1994/77 (30 November 1994) welcomed the acceptance by warring parties of a step by step process to establish a representative Authoritative Council, and called on all states to halt the flow of arms to the warring parties in Afghanistan.
  - S/PRST/1994/43 (11 August 1994) noted with appreciation the efforts of UNSMIA, and called on all parties to cease hostilities.
  - S/PRST/1994/12 (23 March 1994) called for an end to all obstacles to humanitarian aid.
  - S/PRST/1994/4 (24 January 1994) welcomed the support for the Secretary-General’s intention to dispatch a mission to Afghanistan (UNSMIA) to assist with rapprochement and reconstruction and called for the immediate cessation of hostilities.

#### **Secretary-General’s Reports/Letters**

- S/2006/727 (11 September 2006) was the report noting the upsurge in violence, in particular in the south, south-east and east of the country.
- S/2006/145 (7 March 2006) the report proposed the extension of the UNAMA mandate, and the expansion of the mandate to include the provision of strategic and political advice for the on-going peace process.
- S/2005/525 (12 August 2005) the report noted that the political bench-marks outlined in the Bonn Agreement were about to be met with the conclusion of parliamentary and provincial elections. In other areas, institution building, DDR, economic growth and security, however, the benchmarks were yet to be met. The demobilisation and disarmament portion of DDR programs concluded, and efforts continued to reintegrate the remaining former fighters.
- S/2005/183 (18 March 2005) the report noted the continued need for UNAMA’s presence and international military forces and recommended an extension of 12 months.
- S/2004/925 (26 November 2004) was the report of UNAMA’s involvement in Afghanistan which highlighted two key achievements in the preceding year: the approval of the new constitution and the successful presidential election, but notes challenges posed by DDR, security sector reform and counter-narcotics activities.
- S/2004/634 (12 August 2004) the report noted the postponement of parliamentary elections until April 2005 and noted the difficulties in creating the tools of governance necessary.
- S/2004/230 (19 March 2004) the report described the path ahead following the successful adoption of the constitution and highlighted the problems caused by lack of security. The Secretary-General recommended the extension of UNAMA’s mandate for an additional year.
- S/2003/1212 (30 December 2003) the report noted the beginning of several potentially divisive initiatives, including DDR, and the pilot phase of electoral registration. Security concerns were highlighted.
- S/2003/754 and Corr. 1 (29 July 2003) the report identified a deteriorating security situation as the main challenge to the Afghan peace process and reconstruction efforts, and emphasised the difficult human rights situation across the country.
- S/2003/333 (18 March 2003) the report emphasised achievements in reconstruction efforts,

- and consolidation of government authority by the ATA (Afghan Transitional Authority). The Secretary-General recommended extending UNAMA's mandate for a further year and expanding it to include an electoral section.
- S/2002/1173 (21 October 2002) the report described the ongoing work of the ATA, and gave an update on the commissions mandated by the Bonn Agreement: civil service, constitutional, human rights and judicial.
  - S/2002/737 (11 July 2003) the report described the successful holding of the Emergency *Loya Jirga* which resulted in the election of a Head of State, Hamid Karzai, and the approval of structures and appointments of the ATA.
  - S/2002/278 (18 March 2002) the report contained recommendations for UNAMA's structure.
  - S/2001/1215 (18 December 2001) was the final report on the sanctions imposed on the Taliban.
  - S/2001/1157 (6 December 2001) was the report on the situation in Afghanistan, from November 2000 to November 2001, including the effects of the military strikes against Afghanistan, and urged a comprehensive approach to Afghanistan.
  - S/2001/1086 (19 November 2001) was the report on the humanitarian impact of sanctions which could not be issued due to the security situation, and the relocation of UN personnel outside of Afghanistan.
  - S/2001/789 (17 August 2001) was the report on difficulties encountered by UNSMA to develop peace talks between the Taliban and other factions in Afghanistan and the alarming humanitarian situation.
  - S/2001/695 (13 July 2001) was the report on the effects of the sanctions and indicated that the hardships in Afghanistan were caused primarily by the ongoing conflict, not the sanctions regime.
  - S/2001/511 (22 May 2001) was the report from the Committee of Experts with recommendations for the enforcement of the sanctions in Afghanistan.
  - S/2001/384 (19 April 2001) was the report on UNSMA's efforts and the Secretary-General's trip to the region.
  - S/2001/241 (20 March 2001) was the report on the effects of the sanctions and indicated that the humanitarian situation in Afghanistan was critical.
  - S/2000/1106 (20 November 2000) was the annual report on the efforts of UNSMA.
  - S/2000/875 (18 September 2000) the UNSMA report noted the very negative impact of the ongoing conflict on the population.
  - S/2000/581 (16 June 2000) the report noted the deplorable humanitarian conditions of most Afghans and the increasing internationalisation of the conflict.
  - S/2000/205 (10 March 2000) reported the targeting of civilians in the conflict, and estimated that the conflict would continue despite calls for a ceasefire from the Security Council.
  - S/1999/994 (21 September 1999) reported the successful meeting of the "six-plus-two," and the associated Tashkent Declaration.
  - S/1999/698 (21 June 1999) noted the unwillingness of the Taliban to take part in any peace talks and the cyclical outbreak of hostilities every spring.
  - S/1999/362 (31 March 1999) noted limited progress in the talks between the Taliban and other factions, but that the talks themselves were a positive sign.
  - S/1998/913 (2 October 1998) noted the break-down in the peace-talks and the outbreak of fresh hostilities.
  - S/1998/532 (19 June 1998) noted that the conflict continued, fuelled by inflow of arms from outside sources.
  - S/1998/222 (17 March 1998) noted the efforts made by UNSMA over the winter to bring together warring factions in Afghanistan, but deplored the continuing supply of arms from



foreign parties to all sides.

- S/1997/894 (14 November 1997) noted that a peaceful settlement in Afghanistan remains elusive.
- S/1997/719 (17 September 1997) noted the continued heavy fighting in Afghanistan and the appointment of Mr. Lakhdar Brahimi as the Secretary-General's Special Envoy.
- S/1997/482 (16 June 1997) noted the heavy fighting between factions and suggested that any solution would not be forthcoming from a military quarter.

#### **Other Reports**

- S/2003/1074 (11 November 2003) report of the Council Mission to Afghanistan 31 October to 7 November indicated that great strides had been made but that major challenges were still ahead, including the consolidation of peace.

#### **Exchange of Letters Between the Secretary-General and the President of the Council (Selected)**

- S/2006/875 (9 November 2006) contained the names of the delegation and terms of reference for the Council's visiting mission to Afghanistan from 10-17 November 2006.
- S/2006/765 (26 September 2006) contained the quarterly ISAF report of operations between 1 April and 31 July 2006, noting the expansion of ISAF into the south.
- S/2006/318 (24 May 2006) contained the quarterly ISAF report of operations between 1 December 2005 and 30 March 2006, noting an increase in suicide attacks since 2005.
- S/2005/820 (21 December 2005) the Council took note of the Secretary-General's intention to appoint Tom Koenigs as the new Special Representative of the Secretary-General and Head of UNAMA.
- S/2005/634 (10 October 2005) contained the quarterly ISAF report of operations between 6 June and 31 August 2005, noting an increase of troop force from 8,404 in June to 11,551 in August.
- S/2005/574 (9 September 2005) the Secretary-General shared a letter from the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Afghanistan expressing support for the expansion of ISAF.
- S/2005/431 (1 July 2005) contained the quarterly ISAF report of operations between 7 March to 3 June 2005.
- S/2005/230 (6 April 2005) contained the quarterly ISAF report of operations between 25 January to 7 March 2005 which noted the low level of violence might be due to the bad weather.
- S/2005/131 (28 February 2005) contained the quarterly ISAF report of operations between 11 August 2004 and 25 January 2005, and noted the staff was increased from 6,875 to 8,027.
- S/2004/785 (1 October 2004) contained the quarterly ISAF report of operations between 12 May and 11 August 2004 noting the security situation remained calm but unstable.
- S/2004/537 (6 July 2004) contained the quarterly ISAF report of operations between 11 February and 11 May 2004.
- S/2004/222 (17 March 2004) contained the quarterly ISAF report of operations between 12 November 2003 and 12 February 2004, noted that ISAF took control of the first provincial reconstruction team in December.
- S/2004/105 (10 February 2004) the Council took note of the Secretary-General's intention to appoint Jean Arnault as his new Special Representative and Head of UNAMA.
- S/2003/986 (13 October 2003) the Secretary-General shared a letter from the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Afghanistan, requesting the Council to consider the expansion of ISAF.
- S/2003/970 (7 October 2003) following NATO's assumption of control of ISAF in August 2003, the letter contained the NATO strategy for addressing the long-term security needs in Afghanistan, including benchmarks for progress.

- S/2003/504 (23 April 2003) expressed NATO's intentions to expand their presence in Afghanistan as of August 2003.
- S/2001/937 (4 October 2001) the Council took note with appreciation of the Secretary-General's reappointment of Mr. Lakhdar Brahimi as his Special Representative to Afghanistan.

### **Security Council Debates**

- S/PV.5393 (23 March 2006) extended UNAMA's mandate for a further 12 months.
- S/PV.5374 (15 February 2006) endorsed the Afghanistan Compact by unanimously adopting resolution 1659.
- S/PV.5370 (10 February 2006) was a closed meeting attended by Guéhenno and representatives from Germany and Afghanistan.
- S/PV.5369 (10 February 2006) the Council was briefed by Under Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations Jean-Marie Guéhenno on the political events surrounding the formation of the parliament.
- S/PV.5348 (17 January 2006) was a closed meeting attended by Arnault and representatives from Germany and Afghanistan.
- S/PV. 5347 (17 January 2006) the Council was briefed by Arnault who noted the increased violence in the southern provinces of Afghanistan.
- S/PV.5309 (23 November 2005) the Council congratulated the Afghan people on the successful parliamentary and provincial council elections.
- S/PV.5260 (13 September 2005) the Council unanimously adopted resolution 1623, to extend authorisation of ISAF for a further 12 months.
- S/PV.5249 and Corr. 1 (23 August 2005) the Council was briefed by Arnault on the preparations for the elections and the need for additional financial assistance.
- S/PV.5215 (24 June 2005) the Council was briefed by Arnault who warned that the deteriorating security situation could harm upcoming elections.
- S/PV.5148 (24 March 2005) the Council extended UNAMA's mandate for an additional 12 months by unanimously adopting resolution 1589.
- S/PV.5145 (22 March 2005) the Council was briefed by Arnault on the complexities of the parliamentary and provincial-level elections.
- S/PV.5108 (10 January 2005) the Council was briefed by Arnault who focused on the importance of building strong local governments to overcome challenges posed by terrorism, narcotics, and factionalism.
- S/PV.5073 (9 November 2004) the Council was briefed on the recent presidential elections by Guéhenno.
- S/PV.5056 (12 October 2004) the Council released a statement congratulating the Afghan people on successful presidential elections.
- S/PV.5055 (12 October 2004) the Council was briefed by Assistant Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations Hedi Annabi on the recent presidential elections.
- S/PV.5045 (28 September 2004) the Council was briefed by Guéhenno on the preparations for the upcoming elections.
- S/PV.5038 (17 September 2004) the Council unanimously adopted resolution 1563 extending the Afghan security force mandate for an additional 12 months.
- S/PV.5025 (25 August 2004) the Council was briefed by Arnault on the registration of voters.
- S/PV.5004 (15 July 2004) welcomed the holding of the presidential election on 9 October, and stressed the importance of accelerated progress on DDR.
- S/PV.4979 (27 May 2004) the Council was briefed by Arnault who appealed for more support from NATO to help stabilise insecure regions.
- S/PV.4941 (6 April 2004) welcomed the commitment by states for Afghanistan's reconstruction made at the Berlin Conference.

- S/PV.4937 (26 March 2004) extended UNAMA's mandate for an additional 12 months by unanimously adopting resolution 1536.
- S/PV.4931 (24 March 2004) the Council was briefed by Annabi on the significant progress made in Afghanistan, and the preparations for elections.
- S/PV.4893 (15 January 2004) the Council was briefed by Brahimi who stressed the challenges ahead after the successful adoption of the constitution by the *Loya Jirga* on 5 January.
- S/PV.4855 (11 November 2003) the Council was briefed on the recent Council mission to Afghanistan.
- S/PV.4848 (24 October 2003) the Council was briefed by Guéhenno on the challenges insecurity poses to the peace process.
- S/PV.4840 (13 October 2003) authorised the expansion of ISAF beyond Kabul.
- S/PV. 4774 (17 June 2003) focused on the threat to security posed by drug production and trafficking.
- S/PV. 4750 (6 May 2003) the Council was briefed by Brahimi.
- S/PV.4730 (28 March 2003) voted to extend the UNAMA mandate for an additional year.
- S/PV.4727 (27 March 2003) the Council was briefed by Annabi on the paramount importance of security sector reform.
- S/PV.4712 (24 February 2003) was a closed Council meeting attended by Guéhenno and Harald Braun, Special Representative of the German government.
- S/PV. 4711 (24 February 2003) the Council was briefed by Guéhenno who emphasised the insecurity caused by weak national security institutions and strong local commanders.
- S/PV.4699 (31 January 2003) the Council was briefed by Brahimi.
- S/PV.4682 (24 December 2002) endorsed the Kabul Declaration.
- S/PV.4664 (13 December 2002) the Council was briefed by Annabi.
- S/PV.4651 (27 November 2002) extended ISAF's mandate with resolution 1444.
- S/PV.4638 (30 October 2002) the Council was briefed by Brahimi that Afghanistan was making progress but needed continued commitment from other states to achieve lasting conciliation and peace.
- S/PV.4611 (19 September 2002) the Council was briefed by Brahimi that the success of the ATA depended on support by outside states.
- S/PV.4579 (19 July 2002) the Council was briefed by Brahimi who highlighted the security situation in Afghanistan as the major obstacle to peace.
- S/PV.4560 (26 June 2002) welcomed the successful holding of the Emergency *Loya Jirga*.
- S/PV.4557 (21 June 2002) the Council was briefed by Under Secretary-General for Political Affairs Kieran Prendergast on the upcoming *Loya Jirga*.
- S/PV.4541 (23 May 2002) the Council was briefed by Prendergast and agreed to extend the mandate for ISAF.
- S/PV.4521 (25 April 2002) the Council was briefed by Prendergast who noted the progress made in Afghanistan.
- S/PV.4501 (28 March 2002) unanimously adopted resolution 1401 to establish UNAMA following the structure proposed by the Secretary-General in his report S/2002/278.
- S/PV.4497 and Resumption 1 (26 March 2002) following a briefing by Deputy Secretary-General Louise Fréchette, the Council expressed overwhelming support for the establishment of a UN mission in Afghanistan.
- S/PV.4490 (13 March 2002) the Council was briefed by Prendergast, noting progress made in Afghanistan.
- S/PV.4479 (27 February 2002) the Council was briefed by Prendergast, noting faster than expected progress in the political arena.
- S/PV.4469 (6 February 2002) the Council was briefed by Secretary-General Annan and

- Brahimi, noting successful pledging at the Tokyo Conference for Afghanistan.
- S/PV.4461 (30 January 2002) the Council was briefed by Hamid Karzai, the Chairman of the Interim Administration of Afghanistan.
  - S/PV.4452 (16 January 2002) unanimously adopted resolution 1390, freezing assets of the Taliban and Usama bin Laden.
  - S/PV.4449 (15 January 2002) lifted sanctions on Ariana Afghan Airlines.
  - S/PV.4443 (20 December 2001) unanimously adopted resolution 1386 and authorised an international security force for Afghanistan.
  - S/PV.4434 (6 December 2001) adopted resolution 1383 endorsing the interim arrangement in the Bonn Agreement.
  - S/PV.4415 (14 November 2001) charted the future course for action in Afghanistan and unanimously adopted resolution 1378.
  - S/PV.4414 and Resumption 1 (13 November 2001) was a day long debate on the situation in Afghanistan emphasising that Afghanistan was one of the greatest challenges before the UN.
  - S/PV.4352 (30 July 2001) requested a mechanism for tracking the impact of the sanctions imposed on the Taliban.
  - S/PV.4325 and Resumption 1 (5 June 2001) there was widespread support in the Council for a mechanism to track the effects of the sanctions.
  - S/PV.4251 and Corr.1 (19 December 2000) adopted resolution 1333, strengthening sanctions against the Taliban.
  - S/PV.4125 (7 April 2000) agreed to issue a presidential statement (S/PRST/2000/12).
  - S/PV.4124 (7 April 2000) during an open debate, the Council heard from many parties, indicating that the situation in Afghanistan continued to be grim.
  - S/PV.4055 (22 October 1999) condemned the Taliban for continuing military offensives and for sheltering terrorists.
  - S/PV. 4051 (15 October 1999) unanimously voted to adopt resolution 1267 and demanded the Taliban turn over Usama bin Laden to appropriate authorities.
  - S/PV. 4039 and Resumption 1 (27 August 1999) Council heard from numerous states calling to end outside interference in Afghanistan and for access for humanitarian aid.
  - S/PV.3952 (8 December 1998) adopted resolution 1214 unanimously, and also demanded that Taliban stop providing sanctuary for terrorists
  - S/PV.3926 (15 September 1998) agreed to issue a presidential statement (S/PRST/1998/27).
  - S/PV.3921 and Resumption 1 (28 August 1998) the Council, deploring the continued conflict in Afghanistan, unanimously voted to adopt resolution 1193.
  - S/PV.3914 (6 August 1998) expressed deep concern at the serious humanitarian crisis in Afghanistan and demanded an end to hostilities.
  - S/PV.3906 (14 July 1998) expressed grave concern at the continuing conflict and its threat to regional stability and called on parties to engage in a dialogue.
  - S/PV.3869 (6 April 1998) called on Afghan factions, particularly the Taliban, to take steps to assure the safety of UN personnel.
  - S/PV.3841 (15 December 1997) agreed to issue a presidential statement (S/PRST/1997/55).
  - S/PV.3796 (9 July 1997) agreed to issue a presidential statement (S/PRST/1997/35).
  - S/PV.3765 and Resumption 1 and 2 (14, 15 and 16 April 1997) at extended meetings about Afghanistan and the Taliban the Council called on the warring factions to stop fighting and for states to halt supplies of weapons to Afghanistan.
  - S/PV.3706 (22 October 1996) adopted resolution 1076 unanimously and called on states not to interfere in Afghanistan's internal affairs.
  - S/PV.3705 (16 October 1996) was a day long open debate in which the Council was addressed by representatives from neighbouring states to Afghanistan, among others, about the

- worsening situation in Afghanistan, and the involvement of troops from Pakistan in the conflict.
- S/PV.3699 (28 September 1996) agreed to issue a presidential statement (S/PRST/1996/40).
  - S/PV.3650 (9 April 1996) discussed the threat to international peace and security presented by the conflict in Afghanistan, and the relationship of the conflict to certain groups from Pakistan, the lack of central governing authority, and the production of narcotics.
  - S/PV.3631 (15 February 1996) agreed to issue a presidential statement (S/PRST/1996/6).
  - S/PV.3474 (30 November 1994) agreed to issue a presidential statement (S/PRST/1994/77).
  - S/PV.3415 (11 August 1994) agreed to issue a presidential statement (S/PRST/1994/43).
  - S/PV.3353 (23 March 1994) agreed to issue a presidential statement (S/PRST/1994/12).
  - S/PV.3330 (24 January 1994) agreed to issue a presidential statement (S/PRST/1994/4).

#### **Other Documents**

- SC/8860 (9 October 2006) was a press statement expressing concern about the security situation in Afghanistan and the increase in opium cultivation and trafficking.
- S/2006/106 (14 February 2006) was a letter from the Permanent Representative of Afghanistan to the president of the Security Council outlining the new national strategy to combat narcotic production and smuggling in Afghanistan.
- S/2006/105 (14 February 2006) was a letter from the Permanent Representative of Afghanistan to the president of the Security Council attaching the text of the Afghanistan Compact.
- S/2002/1416 (24 December 2002) the Kabul Declaration on Good-Neighbourly Relations was signed.
- S/2001/1154 (5 December 2001) the Bonn Agreement, which established the Interim Authority after the fall of the Taliban, was transmitted to the Council.
- S/2000/809 (21 August 2000) was the report of the Panel on the United Nations Peace Operations (also known as the Brahimi Report).
- S/1999/1021 (1 October 1999) was a letter from the Deputy Permanent Representative of the United States to the president of the Security Council attaching the indictment against Usama bin Laden for his role in the bombing of the US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania.
- S/1999/812 (20 July 1999) the Tashkent Declaration publicly committed members of the “six-plus-two” group not to provide military support to any Afghan party and to prevent the use of their respective territories for such purposes.
- A/RES/48/208 (21 December 1993) the General Assembly requested the Secretary-General to dispatch a new mission, UNSMA, to assist with the rapprochement and reconstruction efforts in Afghanistan.
- A/RES/44/15 (1 November 1989) emphasised the importance of the Geneva Accords, and encouraged the Secretary-General to facilitate a political solution to the problems in Afghanistan and northern Pakistan.
- S/19835 (22 April 1988) was a letter from the Secretary-General to the Council that called for the UNGOMAP deployment of a military force to observe the implementation of the peace treaty. Its Annex contains the text of the Geneva Accords.
- A/RES/40/137 (13 December 1985) was the General Assembly’s resolution that expressed profound concern at the disregard for human rights in Afghanistan.
- E/RES/1984/37 (24 May 1984) ECOSOC requested the Chairman of the Commission for Human Rights to appoint a Special Rapporteur to Afghanistan.
- A/RES/ES.6/2 (14 January 1980) in an emergency session, the General Assembly condemned the invasion of Afghanistan by Soviet troops.

## Historical Background

*October 2006* ISAF took responsibility for security in all of Afghanistan.

*26 September 2006* President Karzai and Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf met at the White House under the auspices of US President George Bush.

*21 September 2006* NATO met at the ministerial level, paving the way for the assumption of responsibility for the security in all of Afghanistan by ISAF in October.

*31 July 2006* ISAF expanded operations into southern Afghanistan.

*23 March 2006* Security Council extended UNAMA's mandate until March 2007.

*February 2006* More robust engagement rules for NATO ISAF troops went into effect.

*31 January 2006* Launch of the Afghanistan Compact, a five-year plan of peacebuilding in Afghanistan, at a meeting in London.

*3 January 2006* The Secretary-General appointed Tom Koenigs of Germany to replace Jean Arnault of France as the Special Representative of the Secretary-General to Afghanistan.

*December 2005* The new parliament was inaugurated in Kabul.

*18 September 2005* Parliamentary elections were held.

*14 March 2005* The Council extended the mandate of ISAF.

*October 2004* Hamid Karzai was elected President.

*March 2004* The Berlin pledging conference took place.

*February 2004* Arnault was appointed as the Secretary-General's Special Representative to Afghanistan and Head of UNAMA.

*January 2004* The *Loya Jirga* adopted the new constitution.

*August 2003* NATO took over command of ISAF.

*December 2002* The Kabul Declaration on Good-Neighbourly Relations was signed by the neighbouring states of China, Iran, Pakistan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan.

*June 2002* Emergency *Loya Jirga* was held in Kabul, which resulted in the establishment of the Transitional Authority, and the election of Hamid Karzai as its president.

*March 2002* The Council established UNAMA, and Brahimi was appointed as the Head of Mission.

*January 2002* The Tokyo pledging conference took place.

*December 2001* The Bonn Compact was adopted, setting up the Afghan Interim Authority under Hamid Karzai. The Council authorised ISAF in resolution 1510.

*November 2001* US-supported forces marched into Kabul.

*October 2001* The international offensive against the Taliban began. Brahimi was reappointed as the Secretary-General's Special Representative to Afghanistan.

*11 September 2001* Al-Qaida carried out attacks on US soil.

*9 September, 2001* Ahmed Shah Massoud was assassinated.

*May 2001* UNSMA offices were forced to close and UN staff withdrew from Afghanistan.

*October 1999* The Council imposed sanctions against the Taliban and Al-Qaida after the Taliban refused to hand over Usama bin Laden.

*August 1998* Al-Qaida attacked US embassies in East Africa. The United States retaliated with a cruise missile attack on Afghanistan.

*July 1997* Ambassador Lakhdar Brahimi was appointed as a high-level special envoy to Afghanistan by the Secretary-General.

*October 1996* The Council, in resolution 1076, called upon all Afghan parties to cease armed hostilities and to engage in political dialogue.

*September 1996* The Taliban, led by Mullah Omar, seized control of Kabul. Taliban forces dragged former President Mohammad Najibullah from the UN compound and executed him.

*May 1996* Usama bin Laden was expelled from Sudan and came to Afghanistan.

*1996* OSGAP was renamed and incorporated into UNSMA.

*1994* Factional fighting led to deaths of 25,000. Mahmoud Mestiri was appointed as the Secretary General's Special Envoy to Afghanistan, and head of UNSMA.

*1994* The Pashtun-led Taliban emerged as serious rival to the Rabbani regime.

*1993* UNSMA was established by the Secretary-General following a request by the General Assembly. Afghanistan had requested assistance with rapprochement and reconstruction.

*1992* Rabbani replaced Najibullah as president. Rabbani led an alliance that included ethnic *mujahedin* forces.

*1991* The United States and the USSR agreed to stop support for the various factions fighting in Afghanistan.

*1990* The mandate of UNGOMAP ended. OSGAP established.

*1989* Soviet forces completed their withdrawal.

1988 Accords were signed between Afghanistan, the United States, Pakistan and the USSR in April in Geneva and Soviet forces began its pullout. In October, the Council adopted resolution 622, which authorised UNGOMAP.

1987 The *Loya Jirga* approved a new republican constitution.

1986 Najibullah replaced Soviet-backed Babrak Karmal as president.

1986 The United States armed *mujahedin* forces with Stinger missiles to attack Soviet helicopters.

1985 The General Assembly adopted resolution 40/137 in December, which expressed profound concern at the disregard for human rights in Afghanistan. The resolution came after the Assembly was presented with a report from the Special Rapporteur of Commission on Human Rights of indiscriminate attacks against civilians.

1984 The Commission on Human Rights appointed a Special Rapporteur on human rights in Afghanistan.

1982 Diego Córdovez was appointed as the Secretary-General's Personal Representative to Afghanistan. Córdovez served in that position until 1988, and oversaw the negotiations leading up to the Geneva Accords.

1981 Javier Perez de Cuellar was appointed as the Secretary-General's Personal Representative to Afghanistan.

1980 An emergency session of the General Assembly adopted resolution ES 6/2 on 14 January, in which it called for the immediate withdrawal of foreign forces in Afghanistan and deplored the Soviet intervention. The Babrak Karmal government was installed by the Soviet forces.

1979 Soviet forces invaded Afghanistan in December after Hafizullah Amin overthrew President Nur Mohammed Taraki, and installed Babrak Karmal.

1978 The Saur Revolution brought the communist party to power. The communist party installed Taraki as president, who signed friendship treaty with Moscow.

1973 General Mohammed Daud took power in coup and declared a republic.

1964 A democratic constitution was approved, with limited power for the monarchy and a limited role for Islamic law.

1963 Daud was forced to resign from the prime minister post after introducing social reforms, including the abolition of the law against women appearing in public.

1953 Daud became the prime minister and sought Soviet economic and military aid.



## Other Relevant Facts

<b>UN Assistance Mission to Afghanistan (UNAMA)</b>
Special Representative of the Secretary-General and UNAMA's Chief of Mission
<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Tom Koenigs (Germany)</li></ul>
<b>Size and Composition of Mission</b>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Current strength: 259 international staff members plus 729 more national staff (as of October 2006)</li></ul>
<b>Duration</b>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• 28 March 2002 to present</li></ul>
<b>International Security Assistance Force (ISAF)</b>
ISAF Commander
<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Lt. Gen. David J Richards (UK)</li></ul>
<b>Size and Composition</b>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Current strength: 31,000 troops.</li><li>• Contributors of military personnel: 37 NATO and non-NATO countries.</li><li>• Current top contributors: UK, Germany, Canada, US and the Netherlands</li></ul>
<b>Duration</b>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• 20 December 2001 to present</li></ul>
<b>OEF: Size, Composition and Duration</b>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Current strength: about 8,000 troops</li><li>• Top contributor: US</li><li>• Duration: 7 October 2001 to present</li></ul>

## Useful Additional Sources

- *Untying the Afghan Knot: Negotiating Soviet Withdrawal*, Riaz M. Khan, Durham: Duke University Press, 1991.
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- UNAMA Web site <http://www.unama-afg.org/>
- ISAF Web site <http://www.afnorth.nato.int/ISAF/index.htm>
- UNGOMAP Web site [http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/co\\_mission/ungomap/](http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/co_mission/ungomap/)
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